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Hello. I am honored to be here today 
at the Institute for Peace Science at 
Hiroshima University. The topic is 
reconstruction and peacebuilding. Whereas 
Professor Abe discussed the 
“reconstruction” aspect and talked about 
how we conduct it, I will address the 
“peacebuilding” dimension of the topic. 
When the Great East Japan 
Earthquake hit, I was shocked. It was 
horrible, wasn’t it? However, an 
earthquake hit South Korea just two days 
ago, and, although it was about magnitude 
four, the event caused the postponement of 
an exam, the scholastic ability test, which 
is equivalent to the National Center Test in 
Japan, for one week. This reaction implies 
that South Korea is not well prepared to 
respond to natural disasters. A lack of 
preparedness probably is because natural 
disasters are infrequent in South Korea. 
Indeed, it is safe to say that South Korea’s 
experience of earthquakes and tsunamis 
has been rare. Instead, the threat to South 
Korea comes from the North. 
Although the situation with North 
Korea is relatively quiet right now, the 
issue of North Korea’s nuclear capacities 
continues to be an extremely delicate 
situation. Today, I will talk about ways that 
peace might be built for the Korean 
Peninsula and in the East Asian region 
under these circumstances. 
There are two ways to deal with this 
issue. The first approach is from the 
perspective of the structure of 
international systems, and the second way 
is from the points of view of the relevant 
actors, namely the states and their citizens. 
Of these two options, I will consider and 
discuss the latter approach. Specifically, I 
will address peacebuilding from the 
perspective of the historical reconciliation 
between Japan and South Korea. 
The root of the North Korea’s nuclear 
issue is found in its efforts to survive after 
the structure of the Cold War collapsed. In 
short, while the structure of the Cold War 
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was a triad comprised of the Soviet Union, 
China, and North Korea in one camp, there 
was a state of equilibrium with South 
Korea, Japan, and the United States on the 
other side. When the Soviet Union ceased 
to exist and the triad collapsed, North 
Korea was faced with the issue of its 
survival. North Korea’s strategy to attempt 
to maintain the old Cold War balance was 
to develop nuclear weapons first and, then, 
develop its economy. That is today’s 
translational strategy for nuclear capacity 
and economy in North Korea. 
Regarding China, one position 
somewhat allows North Korea to develop 
nuclear weapons, but what it really seems 
to want is to create a buffer zone against 
the United States. That said, I believe 
China recognizes that it cannot continue 
with this approach because hydrogen 
bombs have been developed through six 
nuclear tests. 
Meanwhile, the United States has two 
options, namely, to recognize North Korea’s 
nuclear capacities and choose the “balance 
of terror” or to denuclearize North Korea to 
create a peaceful regime and withdraw its 
forces from South Korea. Both options are 
difficult, which is why North Korea, South 
Korea, China, and the United States are all 
in trouble. 
Considering the scenarios on the 
outcome of North Korea’s nuclear capacity, 
the first one would be to maintain the 
current state of armistice, which would 
raise the question of whether North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons should be explicitly or 
implicitly recognized. The United States 
would choose the “balance of terror” option 
by recognizing the nuclear weapons, but 
doing so would not be in its interests.  
The second option would be to enter 
into a peace agreement, eliminate the 
nuclear weapons, and withdraw the 
American forces. This is quite a difficult 
scenario because it will remain very 
difficult for the North and South to 
peacefully coexist for as long as the North 
has nuclear weapons. 
Regarding Korean reunification, it is 
possibly realistic because it would happen 
in the distant future, but I believe it would 
difficult to realize. I am not an expert in 
this area, and, since I cannot predict what 
will happen, I will focus on my area of 
specialty. 
First, these are ideas that concern the 
level of international relationships among 
regimes, and I believe it would be 
extremely difficult for South Korea to take 
independent action. In the context of 
international coexistence, it is obviously 
difficult for any country, including the 
United States and Japan, to unilaterally 
act. Therefore, South Korea should take 
appropriate measures regarding this issue 
based on the international situation and 
how it develops. 
Considering this, the discussion 
refines down to what we can do and, in my 
opinion, South Korea should work on the 
basics and foundation, which are the 
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necessary changes to be made regardless of 
what happens under whatever 
international regime exists. South Korea 
could independently do this, and it should 
take the initiative to do so. This approach 
would develop and maintain friendly 
relations with neighboring countries, 
remove elements that disrupt 
peacebuilding, eliminate factors of conflict, 
and build trustful relationships. South 
Korea could take these steps. The country 
needs to convince its neighbors that 
establishing peace through reunification is 
more desirable than divisive disputes and 
conflicts. 
Conflict takes various forms. There 
are armed conflicts, such as wars and 
terrorism, and there are territorial 
conflicts, trade conflicts, religious conflicts, 
cultural conflicts, and conflicts based on 
history. From the perspective of 
eliminating the factors that cause conflicts 
with neighboring countries, I will address 
the particular conflict based on South 
Korea’s history with its neighbor, Japan. 
This perspective offers a way to resolve or 
manage the historical conflict that impedes 
peacebuilding between Japan and South 
Korea. 
At this point, let us consider the 
relationship between the concept of 
“reconstruction,” which is the subject of 
today’s discussion, and historical conflicts. 
When a conflict occurs, destruction tends to 
follow. Some of this destruction is physical, 
and some of it is psychological. The 
physical aspect includes the destruction of 
basic social systems and casualties. The 
psychological damage includes such things 
as psychic damage and mental traumas. 
Moreover, states lose dignity, which 
influences the sense of identity. 
In this context, reconstruction is 
understood as restoration of the original 
state; however, when we consider whether 
it is even possible to restore the original 
state, we find that it probably cannot be 
done. Considering the physical damages, I 
doubt that it is possible to revive the 
victims through reconstruction. The best-
case scenario would be to rebuild while 
moving forward. It is not possible to undo 
the damage; thus, reconstruction is not 
restoration. It is creating things anew. 
Similarly, it is not possible to undo 
the psychological damage and disability 
caused by a conflict. We cannot treat 
psychological damage as if it never 
happened. Therefore, what must happen is 
that the country matures. It means that the 
country should mentally mature, which is 
precisely what we mean by the term 
“reconciliation.” So, I believe the 
combination of reconstruction and 
reconciliation makes peacebuilding 
possible. 
From that point of view, the historical 
conflicts between Japan and South Korea 
are long-term issues in which emotion rules 
reasoning and taboos determine what can 
and cannot be discussed. The conflicts also 
involve the two national identities and, 
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sometimes, justification seems to be more 
important than actual benefits. 
As a result, as you surely know, the 
militaries are at issue between South 
Korea and Japan, and, although the two 
governments reached agreement in 
December of 2015, there was not a 
resolution and the dispute continues. 
Currently, it is deadlocked. With Moon Jae-
in as president, South Korea is searching 
for a way to break through the impasse and 
find a way to do something about it. 
However, the situation is quite difficult. 
By the way, the message, “Let’s make 
bold and frank discussions,” is at this 
international symposium. In support of 
that statement, I will somewhat boldly talk 
about a way that the historical conflicts 
between Japan and South Korea might be 
eliminated and reconciliation achieved. 
First, I will review the historical relations 
between Japan and South Korea. 
At the end of World War II in 1945, 
Japan was defeated. This meant liberation 
for South Korea. Subsequently, diplomatic 
relations between Japan and South Korea 
were normalized in 1965. This achievement 
was made possible through the leadership 
of President Park Chung-hee and Prime 
Minister Kim Jong-pil. I refer to this period 
as “the 1.0 era of Japanese and South 
Korean relations.” 
Then, in 1998, President Kim Dae-
jung and Prime Minister Obuchi declared 
the Japan-South Korea partnership. I 
name this period “the 2.0 era of Japanese 
and South Korean relations.” Various 
action plans agreed to by President Kim 
Dae-jung and Prime Minister Obuchi were 
implemented. Twenty years have passed, 
and 2018 will mark the 20th anniversary of 
that declaration. I am sure that numerous 
events will be held next year, but we should 
not let them be mere memorials. I believe 
we need a groundbreaking plan at that 
point to initiate “the 3.0 era of Japanese 
and South Korean relations.” I have several 
ideas on that topic, and I will share a 
couple of them with you today. 
I believe the first step should be to 
learn from the 2.0 era. That is, we should 
reflect on what happened during the 2.0 era 
and, after completing that process, we will 
be prepared to enter the 3.0 era. We could 
begin with a joint symposium for Japan and 
South Korea. The agenda could include 
various items for discussion, such as the 
historical meaning of the 2.0 era, the status 
of the action plans, and the types of things 
to be explored in the 3.0 era. This type of 
symposium could be held at various places 
and in various ways. 
I believe that the second step should 
be to consider establishing a joint citizens’ 
assembly for Japan and South Korea. I 
believe it also would be important for the 
Japanese and South Korean citizens to 
gather to converse about historical issues 
and to present the understandings they 
reach during that process. By doing that, 
the people who attend those meetings 
would be able to discuss creating a 
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community comprising Japan and South 
Korea without reference to nationality. I 
believe that the 3.0 era would begin when 
discussion on this new community spreads 
with the incentive to establish a Japan-
South Korea community. 
To implement these ideas, I hope the 
Institute for Peace Science at Hiroshima 
University, our Peace and Democracy 
Institute at Korea University, and the 
Global Institute for Japanese Studies at 
Korea University have a central role. 
Finally, I will share my sense of the 
three principles of reconciliation needed to 
enter the 3.0 era. I aim to establish a 
direction and principles that differ from 
those of the reconciliation between Japan 
and South Korea during the 1.0 era and the 
2.0 era. 
The first principle is that we need 
reflective vision. I mean that, now, when we 
study or argue about conflict issues 
between Japan and South Korea, it 
generally become a self-centered discussion. 
That is, we selfishly ignore things about 
ourselves or attack things about the other 
party. However, I believe it is important to 
reflectively investigate the causes and 
processes in which the conflict arose. We 
need a new perspective, which is equitable 
concerning the issues and reasons that the 
parties act the way they do. 
The second principle is about 
reconciliation as a process. The 
reconciliation of the 2.0 era involved the 
forgiveness and acceptance of the victims 
after the apology of the wrongdoer and the 
subsequent establishment of reconciliation. 
In that process, reconciliation is the end. 
Without the apology of the wrongdoer and 
the forgiveness of the victim, reconciliation 
is impossible. That is why the current 
deadlock situation exists between Japan 
and South Korea. 
However, reconciliation is not a one-
time event; it is gradually achieved as we 
move forward one step at a time. Its process 
even might be endless. In the course of that 
process, a joint effort to confirm the 
historical facts is necessary, and the past 
must be remembered and memorialized 
based on those confirmed facts with 
cooperation and interaction into the future. 
Therefore, I believe reconciliation is an 
endless process. 
The third principle of reconciliation is 
to involve the public. In South Korea, the 
people who talk about this history are those 
who are victims and the citizen groups that 
support them. In Japan, conscious 
intellectuals and the radical right are 
engaged in the discourse, and the 
governments of both countries are involved. 
However, I believe we need to create a 
space for open discussions with ordinary 
citizens. I believe it is essential to openly 
share these historical issues with ordinary 
citizens. 
In conclusion, if we were to steadily 
proceed down this path of reconciliation as 
a process, peace and unification of the 
Korean Peninsula, and subsequent 
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peacebuilding in the East Asian region, 
would be realizable, which ultimately 
would contribute to world peace.  
Thank you 
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